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The	Prague	School	
Hynek	Janoušek	and	Robin	Rollinger				The	name	the	“Prague	school	of	Brentano”	refers	to	three	generations	of	thinkers	who	temporarily	or	permanently	lived	in	Prague,	bound	together	by	teacher/student	relationships,	and	who	accepted	the	main	views	of	Franz	Brentano’s	philosophy.	In	1879	Carl	Stumpf	(see	CHAP.	31)	arrived	in	Prague	to	take	up	a	professorship	of	philosophy	at	the	Charles-Ferdinand	University.	In	1880	Stumpf’s	close	friend	and	also	a	student	of	Brentano,	Anton	Marty	(see	CHAP.	30),	became	a	professor	in	the	same	department.	This	marks	the	beginning	of	the	Prague	School.	The	presence	of	Stumpf	and	Marty	was	in	fact	a	dramatic	shift	in	orientation	first	and	foremost	in	the	domain	of	psychology,	for	Prague	had	previously	been	an	enclave	of	Herbartian	psychology,	which	Brentano	had	criticized	in	various	respects	throughout	his	Psychology	from	an	Empirical	Standpoint	(Brentano	1874).	In	a	certain	sense	their	presence	even	harked	back	to	an	earlier	time	in	Prague	when	Bernard	Bolzano	was	developing	a	theory	of	science	very	much	in	opposition	to	the	Kantianism	of	his	time.	Though	Brentano’s	philosophy	was	very	different	from	Bolzano’s	in	many	respects,	it	was	no	less	anti-Kantian.	This	was	very	important	at	that	time,	for	neo-Kantianism	was	on	the	rise	in	the	German-speaking	world	and	even	beyond,	whereas	Stumpf	and	Marty	made	efforts	to	combat	this	kind	of	philosophy.	Though	Stumpf’s	sojourn	in	Prague	was	considerably	shorter-lived	than	Marty’s,	Stumpf	published	the	first	volume	of	his	Tone	Psychology	(Stumpf	1883)	during	that	time.	This	work	drew	not	only	on	the	general	psychological	framework	that	Brentano	had	developed,	but	also	used	experimentation	as	a	source	of	knowledge.	Stumpf	thereby	initiated	a	competition	with	other	orientations	in	this	domain,	most	notably	with	that	of	Wilhelm	Wundt’s	psychological	laboratory	in	Leipzig.	When	Stumpf	decided	to	leave	Prague	in	1884	in	order	to	accept	a	professorship	in	Halle,	Brentano	was	very	displeased	(see	the	quotation	from	a	letter	from	Brentano	to	Marty,	July-August	1884,	as	quoted	in	Fisette	2015:	476	n.).	As	he	was	advancing	his	psychology	and	philosophy	in	Vienna,	Brentano	thought	that	the	influence	of	his	teachings	would	be	considerably	enhanced	in	the	Habsburg	Empire	by	Stumpf	
 
2 
and	Marty	in	Prague.	Nonetheless,	Marty	continued	to	live	in	Prague	until	his	death	in	1914.	He	too	was	very	much	concerned	with	issues	in	psychology,	but	with	a	distinctive	concentration	on	the	philosophy	of	language.	While	Stumpf	had	helped	to	advance	Brentanian	psychology	in	opposition	to	other	currents,	Marty	distinguished	himself	by	describing	and	analyzing	language	in	competition	with	other	orientations	that	prevailed	at	the	time	in	study	of	language.	Moreover,	the	critique	of	language	remained	an	enduring	aspect	of	the	intellectual	climate	in	Prague,	as	later	exhibited	by	the	Prague	Linguistic	Circle.	By	the	early	20th	century	Marty	had	become	a	very	impressive	and	effective	mentor	for	students	who	formed	a	group	around	him.	These	students	represent	the	second	generation	of	the	Prague	school.	Most	notable	among	them	were	Emil	Arleth,	Emil	Utitz,	Oskar	Kraus,	Alfred	Kastil,	Franz	Hillebrand,	Hugo	Bergman,	Josef	Eisenmayer,	Otto	Funke,	and	Oskar	Engländer	(see	CHAP.	37,	40).	Marty	put	most	of	them	in	contact	with	Brentano,	whom	they	visited	for	philosophical	conversations	and	with	whom	they	regularly	exchanged	philosophical	letters.1	When	in	1916	Oskar	Kraus	became	a	professor	of	philosophy	in	Prague,	his	students,	as	well	as	students	visiting	Prague	to	study	under	his	guidance,	constituted	the	third	generation	of	the	Prague	school.	At	least	three	of	them	should	be	mentioned	–	Georg	Katkov,	Walter	Engel	and	Eberhard	Rogge.	Roughly	around	1916,	Brentano’s	reism	(see	CHAP.	12)	became	the	official	teaching	of	the	more	orthodox	members	of	the	Prague	Brentano	school.	The	development	and	application	of	reism	in	different	areas	of	descriptive	psychology	became	the	main	working	project	of	this	orthodox	group	(for	a	similar	development	in	Innsbruck	see	CHAP.	40).2	Besides	Marty	and	his	students,	other	students	and	Enkelschülern	of	Brentano’s	came	to	Prague	as	well.	After	the	Charles-Ferdinand	University	split	into	the	German	and	the	Czech	parts	in	1882,	a	former	student	of	Brentano’s,	Thomas	Garrigue	Masaryk,	attained	a	professorship	in	philosophy	and	sociology	at	the	Czech	philosophical	faculty.	Two	students	of	Meinong’s,	Christian	von	Ehrenfels	and	Alois	Höfler	(see	CHAP.	31,	40),	became	professors	in	Prague	as	well	(Ehrenfels	in	1896	and	Höfler	in	1903).	However,	the	relationship	of	Marty	and	his	pupils	to	Ehrenfels	and	Höfler	was	often	tense	and	unfriendly,	for	they	diverged	considerably	from	Brentanian	orthodoxy	in	various	respects.		Masaryk	became	a	leading	intellectual	figure	in	Bohemia	and	his	political	activities	came	to	fruition	when	the	republic	of	Czechoslovakia	was	established	in	1918	and	he	became	
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its	first	president.		In	1930,	when	he	was	celebrating	his	eightieth	birthday,	Masaryk	was	awarded	twenty	million	crowns	by	the	state	for	his	role	in	the	creation	of	Czechoslovakia.	Masaryk,	who	had	been	supporting	work	done	by	Kraus	on	the	new	editions	of	Brentano’s	books	since	1925,	granted	a	part	of	the	award	to	Kraus	and	other	Brentano	students	to	establish	the	Brentano	Society	in	Prague	and	the	Brentano	Archives	with	an	official	goal	of	publishing	Brentano’s	work	and	of	spreading	knowledge	of	his	philosophy	(Bayerová	1990).	From	1931	to	1939	the	Prague	members	of	the	society,	especially	Kraus	and	Katkov,	developed	international	contacts	with	England3	and	Poland4	as	well	as	other	interested	philosophers	abroad.	The	society	published	four	philosophical	volumes	of	texts	of	its	members	and	continued	editing	and	transcribing	Brentano’s	work	for	publication.	Sixty	years	of	the	philosophical	work	done	in	Prague	in	the	name	of	Franz	Brentano	came	to	an	end	in	1939	when	Kraus	followed	his	student	Katkov	into	exile	in	England	to	save	his	life	after	the	German	occupation	of	Czechoslovakia.	Most	of	the	archives	were	moved	to	Bodleian	Library	in	Oxford.	The	society	remained	in	existence,	but	it	was	taken	over	by	German	authorities.	In	1942	Kraus	died	of	cancer	in	Oxford.	Utitz	survived	the	concentration	camp	in	Terezín.5	Rogge	was	shot	at	the	eastern	front.	Engel	never	wrote	on	philosophy	again.	Katkov	could	not	find	a	proper	position	in	philosophy	and	switched	his	research	field	to	the	modern	history	of	Russia.	At	the	end	of	the	war	the	Prague	property	of	the	society	was	raided	by	Russian	troops.	After	the	communist	revolution	in	1948	the	society	remained	inactive	until	1955	when	it	was	finally	dissolved.6	Since	a	many	of	the	other	chapters	in	the	Handbook	deal	with	the	life	and	work	of	the	members	of	the	Prague	School	individually	or	describe	it	in	some	way,	here	the	philosophical	topics	of	the	Prague	school	will	be	discussed	mainly	with	respect	to	the	so-called	orthodox	school	of	Brentano	–	i.e.	to	the	work	of	Kraus	and	Kraus’s	students.		
1.	The	Reistic	Turn	within	the	Prague	School			Initially,	all	Marty’s	students	–	e.g.	Eisenmeier,	Bergman,	Kraus,	Kastil	–	supported	and	defended	Marty’s	view	of	intentionality.	This	meant	accepting	Marty’s	version	of	states	of	affairs	and	states	of	values	(Wertverhalte)	required	by	his	adequation	theory	of	truth	and	value.	Marty	viewed	these	entities	as	special	non-real	contents	of	judgments	and	emotions	(respectively)	and	as	existing	in	the	present	time,	but	devoid	of	any	causal	power	(see	CHAP.	
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30).	According	to	Marty,	these	contents	cannot	be	reduced	to	real	things,	for	there	are	also	truths	(and	values)	concerning	non-existing	objects.	Nor	can	they	be	reduced	to	immanent	objects	of	our	acts	on	Marty’s	view,	for	this	would	make	the	whole	relation	of	adequacy	between	correct	acts	and	contents	purely	subjective	(Marty	1908:	295).	In	the	case	of	judgments	the	content	is	a	being	or	non-being	or	possibility	or	necessity	of	presented	objects	(for	further	details	see	Smith	1995:	92-115).	In	the	domain	of	emotions	the	contents	are	either	positive	or	negative	values	or	their	betterness	or	worseness.	A	closely	related	doctrine	that	Marty	taught	is	that	of	non-real	hypothetical	predicates,	or	relative	determinations.	According	to	Marty,	in	affirming,	for	example,	that	Barack	Obama	is	bigger	than	Napoleon	I	have	affirmed	a	counterfactual	determination	of	Obama	–	if	Napoleon	were	here,	Obama	would	be	bigger.	This	property	is	not	real,	but	it	is	nevertheless	a	property	which	Obama	really	has	(see	Marty	1908:	437).	Such	determinations	were	used	in	Marty’s	theory	of	intentional	relations.	According	to	Marty,	every	mental	phenomenon	is	either	ideally	conformal	to	its	content	or,	in	the	case	where	the	content	of	consciousness	does	not	exist,	the	conformity	of	the	mental	phenomenon	is	its	relative	determination	(Marty	1908:	423-426).	Conformity	of	an	incorrect	mental	phenomenon	to	a	content	is	a	relative	determination	as	well.	Brentano	rejected	Marty’s	non-real	objects	and	determinations	in	his	correspondence	with	Marty	(see	e.g.	Brentano	1930:	87-96/1966:	52-9).	Marty	nevertheless	kept	his	view	and	all	his	Prague	students	initially	followed	suit.	Kastil	defended	Marty’s	views	in	his	instructive	critique	of	Twardowski’s	concept	of	immanent	intentional	objects	(see	Kastil	1909:	51-58;	183-190).	Kraus	held	the	theory	in	his	1914	critique	of	contemporary	theories	of	value	(Kraus	1914:	3-4)	and	in	his	introduction	to	the	four	volumes	of	Marty’s	Gesammelte	Schriften	(Kraus	1916).	Similar	defense	of	Marty’s	views	can	be	found	e.g.	in	Eisenmeier	(Eisenmeier	1923:	9-12)	and	Bergman	(Bergman	1908:	8-10).	After	Marty’s	death	Brentano	managed	to	persuade	most	of	Marty’s	former	students	to	abandon	the	views	of	their	teacher	in	favor	of	his	own	reism	(for	Brentano’s	arguments	against	non-real	entities	see	Brentano	1930:	87-118/1966:	52-71).		From	now	on	descriptive	psychology	was	to	be	done	hand	in	hand	with	the	reistic	critique	of	language,	for	whenever	we	believe	that	we	relate	ourselves	to	something	non-real	we	are	mislead	by	a	linguistic	fiction.	This	critique	for	Brentano	was	actually	his	attempt	to	solve	the	problem	of	the	many	different	meanings	of	“what	is”	as	it	was	found	in	the	
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Aristotelian	metaphysics.	Only	a	thing,	on	this	view,	is	(or	exists)	in	the	strict	and	proper	sense	(im	eigentlichen	Sinn),	whereas	other	alleged	objects	can	be	said	to	be	only	in	an	improper	sense.	The	linguistic	fictions	which	result	from	an	improper	speech	are	the	result	of	using	so-called	synsemantic	expressions	as	if	they	were	autosemantic	one.	(In	Marty’s	terminology,	these	expressions	are	suggested	by	the	inner	grammatical	form.	See	CHAP.	30,	Kraus	1942:	102-3.)	Such	“false	friends”	are,	for	example,	names	of	properties	(form-words)	such	as	“redness”	–	for	according	to	this	view,	there	is	no	redness,	there	are	only	red	objects	–	or	the	so-called	reflexive	words	whose	meanings	have	to	be	decoded	by	reflexive	analysis	of	intentional	mental	phenomena.	“Existence”,	“non-existence”,	“value”,	“fiction”,	“preference”	are	examples	of	such	reflexive	words.	Therefore,	a	proper	reistic	reformulation	of	the	statements	containing	hidden	synsemantic	expressions	has	to	be	given	such	that	the	real	meaning	of	these	expressions	becomes	visible	(Kraus	1942:	116).	Since	Brentano	left	the	project	of	reism	in	its	programmatic	stage,	Kraus,	Kastil	and	their	students	tried	to	offer	their	own	answers	to	concrete	philosophical	problems.	
	
2.	Selected	Problems	of	the	Reistic	Theory	of	Intentional	Consciousness	
	
2.1	Reistic	Reinterpretation	of	Hypothetical	Determinations	While	Marty	formulated	his	theory	of	non-real	contents	and	relative	determinations	to	describe	intentional	relations,	Brentano	replaced	his	theory	of	intentional	relations	with	a	view	that	they	are	in	fact	merely	relation-like	(see	CHAP.	4).	For	they	do	not	require	(but	do	not	exclude)	the	existence	of	both	members	of	the	relation.	Instead,	only	the	existence	of	the	fundament	of	the	relation	is	necessary	if	the	relation	exists	(for	other	cases	of	what	is	relation-like,	see	Kraus	1942,	Kastil	1951:	132-5).	Now,	Marty	used	his	theory	of	relative	determinations	to	explain	certain	cases	comparative	relations,	e.g.	“The	population	of	the	world	is	less	then	eighteen	billion”.	Hence,	reistic	interpretation	of	these	comparative	relations	had	to	be	given.	Kraus	(1924:	XXXVIII/2009:	295)	offered	one	in	his	introduction	to	the	Psychology	from	an	Empirical	Standpoint.	Kraus’	strategy	is	based	on	how	we	think	or	
present	relatives.	Whenever	a	relative	is	presented,	its	fundament	is	presented	directly	(in	
modo	recto)	and	the	terminus,	i.e.	that	to	which	the	fundament	stands	in	relation,	is	presented	indirectly	(in	modo	obliquo).	In	this	way,	for	example,	our	inner	perception	as	a	moment	of	any	mental	acts	presents	intentionality.	The	inner	perception,	which	is	inherent	to	all	mental	
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phenomena,	has	as	its	object	the	mental	phenomenon	in	modo	recto	in	relation	to	its	intentional	object,	which	is	co-presented	modo	obliquo.	If	a	relative	is	affirmed	(as	is	always	the	case	with	inner	perception),	the	only	thing	affirmed	is	the	fundament,	while,	according	to	Kraus,	the	terminus	is	that	through	which	the	affirmed	fundament	is	determined	in	its	presentation.	Therefore,	in	expressions	such	as	“The	population	of	the	world	is	less	than	eighteen	billion”	we	only	have	in	mind	what	is	associated	with	the	term	“eighteen	billion”	so	that	we	can	present	a	general	idea	of	size	to	specify	the	population	which	really	is	affirmed.	However,	Katkov	(1930:	83)	pointed	out	that	Marty	had	serious	objections	to	this	approach,	which	echo	objections	made	by	Brentano	himself	(see	Taieb	2015:	194-5).	For	example:	
Relations	have	often	been	characterized	as	forms	of	thought,	as	something	that	would	be	established	or	produced	by	our	conception	of	things.	If	this	is	understood	in	the	strict	sense,	it	obviously	means	that	they	do	not	lie	in	the	things	themselves,	but	are	rather	put	into	them	by	our	act	of	presenting.	However,	someone	who	regards	the	relation	as	something	objective,	as	belonging	to	the	objects,	must	forego	seeing	them	as	a	matter	of	forms	of	thought	in	the	sense	of	subjective	modes	of	presentation.	If,	however,	someone	wanted	to	call	them	a	matter	of	objective	modes	of	our	act	of	presenting	–	wherein	could	this	objectivity	consist	but	in	the	fact	that	what	is	given	therein	is	something	belonging	to	the	objects,	hence	a	differentia	of	objects	…	?		(Marty	1910:	67)		If	the	affirmation	of	the	comparative	relation	is	true,	then	the	relation	must	be	something	
objective	and	not	just	a	part	of	our	subjective	presenting	of	the	fundament.	Katkov	(1930:	486-7)	therefore	suggested	a	different	reistic	solution	of	the	problem.	His	solution	consists	in	the	reduction	of	Marty’s	hypothetical	predicates	into	apodictic	rejections	of	complexes	of	which	both	fundament	and	terminus	are	parts.	For	example,	the	judger7	in	the	above	example	apodictically	rejects	someone	evidently	affirming	a	group	of	eighteen	billion	people	which	does	not	include	the	number	of	living	people	as	its	part.	In	the	judgment	“White	is	a	lighter	color	than	pure	black”	the	judger	apodictically	rejects	someone	evidently	affirming	an	instance	of	pure	black	that	has	the	same	or	greater	lightness	than	white	and	without	having	to	worry	that	perception	of	pure	black	is	factually	impossible	(see	Katkov	1930:	485-6).	These	reistic	interpretations	presuppose	reistic	understanding	of	sentences	referring	to	possibility	and	impossibility.	These	were	usually	treated	by	the	late	Prague	school	of	Brentano	as	judgments	pertaining	to	modes	(evident/blind,	apodictic/assertoric,	affirmative/negative)	of	judgments	made	by	a	judger	as	such	(als	solcher)	of	objects	presented	
in	obliquo.	The	following	elucidations	roughly	state	the	reistic	strategy	(Katkov	1930:	530-1,	Rogge	1934:	28-32)	in	relation	to	modalities.	If	I	say	1.	“A	is	possible”	then	I	apodictically	reject	a	judger	as	such	who	is	apodictically	rejecting	A	
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with	self-evidence.	2.	“A	is	impossible”	then	I	apodictically	reject	a	judger	as	such	who	is	apodictically	affirming	A	with	self-evidence.	If	one	leaves	out	the	apodicticity	from	the	affirmation	in	point	1	or	the	negation	in	point	2,	one	gets	an	interpretation	of	“A	is	existing”	(point	1)	or	A	is	not	existing	(point	2).	A	similar	kind	of	answer	would	have	to	be	given	to	the	analysis	of	“A	is	necessary”	(such	an	attempt	was	made	by	Rogge	1934:	32-40).	 	
2.2	Katkov’s	Reduction	of	Intentional	Contents	of	Presentations,	Judgments	When	Twardowski	distinguished	between	the	intentional	content	and	the	intentional	object	of	presentations	(see	CHAP.	35),	his	distinction	caught	on	among	Brentano’s	students,	as	both	Meinong	and	Husserl	began	employing	their	own	versions	of	it.	However,	according	to	the	late	Brentano,	to	call	an	object	“intentional”	is	only	to	linguistically	fix	an	intentional	activity	of	which	the	object	is	an	object	and	turn	it	into	an	external	attribute	of	the	object	at	the	risk	of	creating	a	fictional	class	of	special	“intentional”	objects.	The	horse	I	see	is	a	“seen	horse”,	the	object	I	want	is	a	“wanted	object”	but	there	are	not	two	horses	or	two	objects	of	desire	present.	The	intentional	objects	(in	both	senses	distinguished	by	Twardowski)	as	special	entities	have	to	be	rejected.	However,	Brentano’s	reism	once	again	had	to	face	the	problem	of	non-existing	objects.	Presenting	“this”	(e.g.	a	chair)	and	not	“that”	(e.g.	a	person)	is	a	real	attribute	of	intentionality.	But	if	the	object	of	intention	does	not	exist	and	there	are	no	intentional	contents,	how	can	intentionality	be	differentiated	with	respect	to	objects?	Once	again,	the	answer	of	the	late	Prague	school	is	based	on	the	theory	of	inner	perception.	Whenever	I	present	an	object	I	affirm	myself	in	the	secondary	inner	awareness	(see	CHAP.	5)	as	a	“presenter”	of	this	object	which	is	presented	modo	obliquo.	The	so-called	immanent	content	is	nothing	but	a	primary	intentionality	(an	intentional	relative)	presented	as	object	of	its	own	inner	perception.	The	differences	between	intentional	contents	are	in	reality	differences	between	people	who	“take	themselves	to	be”.	According	to	Katkov	(1930:	493)	and	Kraus	(1934a:	46-7),	the	whole	theory	gives	us	an	a	priori	proof	of	the	self-reflective	nature	of	intentionality,	for	according	to	this	theory	the	primary	presentation	of	X	must	be	grounded	in	being	conscious	of	oneself	as	being	conscious	of	X	in	an	indirect	way	(Katkov	1930:	507).8	
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Contents	of	judgments	(states	of	affairs)	must	be	reduced	in	a	similar	way	to	the	character	of	universal	validity	of	judgments	(see	Kraus’	remark	in	Brentano	1930:	185-6/2009:	109,	Katkov	1930:	539-0).	Brentano	never	really	specified	how	the	intention	of	a	universal	validity	(correctness)	of	judgment	(truth	claim)	is	unified	with	judgment.	Since	there	are	judgments	which	continue	even	though	we	know	about	their	falsity	(namely,	primitive	sensory	perceptions),	Katkov	decided	to	interpret	the	intention	of	correctness	of	a	judgment	(i.e.	that	we	take	the	judgment	to	be	true)	as	a	second-order	apodictic	rejection	of	the	self-evidence	of	the	contradictory	judgment	(or	rather	of	the	contradicting	evident	“judger”	as	such).	From	this	it	follows	that	there	could	be	beings,	for	example	some	animals,	who	could	judge	about	something	with	self-evidence	without	being	aware	that	the	opposite	is	necessarily	false.	Traditionally	speaking,	such	beings	would	not	be	conscious	of	the	law	of	contradiction,	and	yet	they	would,	for	example,	have	evident	inner	affirmation	of	their	mental	acts.	This	(blind	or	evident)	intention	of	objective	validity	is	responsible	for	the	fiction	of	states	of	affairs	in	which	“the	specific	moments	of	judgments	are	mixed	together	into	one	whole	with	specific	moments	of	things	about	which	we	judge”	(Katkov	1930:	536).	This	theory	improves	Marty’s	theory	of	communication	(Katkov	1930:	527-4,	1937:	13-4),	for	it	is	not	enough,	as	Marty	claimed,	to	manifest	that	I	am	making	a	judgment	in	order	to	move	the	listener	to	consider	following	the	same	judgment.	I	have	to	make	the	listener	aware	that	I	take	my	judgment	for	a	correct	one.			
2.3	The	Self-Evidence	of	Inner	Perception	In	1908	Hugo	Bergman	devoted	a	whole	book	to	the	problem	of	explaining	Brentano’s	concept	of	the	self-evidence	of	inner	perception	(see	CHAP.	37).	The	result	was	a	meager	one.	A	detailed	defense	of	a	strictly	Brentanian	view	of	the	self-evidence	of	inner	consciousness	limited	this	self-evidence	to	simple	existential	affirmations	of	mental	phenomena	(Bergman	1908:	6).	Following	hints	from	the	Psychology	from	an	Empirical	Standpoint	Bergman	claimed	that	this	affirmation	is	only	implicit	and	simultaneous	with	the	inwardly	perceived	phenomenon	and	–	although	conceptually	differentiable	from	the	perceived	act	–	recognized	
as	identical	with	it	(1908:	12).	However,	it	was	very	hard	to	see	how	this	implicit	consciousness	could	be	of	any	use	in	descriptive	psychology	since	psychology	presupposes	an	
explicit	reflexive	grasp	which	makes	the	acts	primary	objects	of	investigation	in	order	to	conceptualize	them	for	further	general	psychological	insights.	Such	a	shift	of	attention	
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presupposes	memory,	but	memory	does	not	admit	of	self-evidence.	Furthermore,	the	disagreement	between	different	psychological	descriptions	was	explained	by	the	occasional	lack	of	distinctiveness	(Undeutlichkeit)	of	our	inner	consciousness.	In	looking	for	answers	Kraus	and	his	students	wrongly9	ascribed	to	Brentano	a	theory	of	apperception	which	was	published	as	Brentano’s	official	view	in	Brentano	1928	(which	Kraus	billed	as	Vol.	III.	of	the	Psychology	from	an	Empirical	Standpoint).	This	theory	recognizes	an	evident	act	of	reflexive	perception	(the	so-called	apperception)	that	is	still	evident	even	though	it	is	not	identical	with	the	perceived	act,	because	we	have	evidence	that	it	could	not	have	been	caused	by	anything	else.	Such	evidence	of	causality	is	called	by	Brentano	the	evidence	of	motivation	(see	Kastil	1951:	223-9).	Brentano	writes:	“The	act	of	apperception	is	therefore	caused	by	the	act	of	perception	and	has	at	the	same	time	the	character	of	being	motivated	by	the	act	of	perception.	Precisely	by	this	being-motivated	the	act	of	apperception	is	evident.”	(Brentano	1928:	34-5/1981b:	26)	However,	not	everybody	accepted	this	explanation.	For	example,	Rogge	clearly	recognized	that	this	could	not	have	been	Brentano’s	position	and	refused	it.10		
2.4	Presentations	as	a	Fundamental	Class	of	Mental	Phenomena	One	of	the	most	permanent	features	of	Brentano’s	thinking	was	his	view	that	all	intentional	acts	are	either	presentations	or	based	on	presentations.	The	question	whether	this	principle	should	be	upheld	was	raised	among	the	Prague	Brentanists,	specifically	by	Kraus’	student	Walter	Engel.	The	outlines	of	Engel’s	theory	were	presented	by	Kraus	(Kraus	1937:	167).	Unfortunately,	the	war	prevented	Engel	from	publishing	his	view,	and	the	only	thing	which	survived	is	Kraus’	short	report	of	it:	
According	to	Brentano’s	theory,	the	relation	of	a	presentation	is	the	basis	of	judgement	and	emotion	in	a	similar	way	as	substance	is	to	the	accident.	However,	it	is	possible	to	advocate	another	version:	Every	consciousness,	as	is	well	known,	is	something	that	relates	to	something;	it	can	vary	in	three	respects:	1.	The	one	who	is	relating	can	change	in	his	individuality.	2.	He	can,	as	someone	who	relates,	change	qualitatively	or	modally	(by	being	a	presenter,	a	judger	or	someone	conducting	himself	emotionally).	3.	He	can	change	by	relating	to	something	else,	so-called	“object-differentia”.	If	this	view	were	correct,	it	should	not	be	said	that	there	is	for	every	consciousness	an	underlying	presenting,	but	rather	that	there	could	not	be	a	consciousness	without	object-relation	any	more	than	one	without	a	certain	quality	of	relation.	Dr.	Walter	Engel	(Prague)	advocates	this	view	in	a	work	that	is	not	yet	published.	Although	this	variational	Husserl-like	approach	was	presented	only	as	a	working	hypothesis,	
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it	reveals	an	open-minded	approach	of	Kraus	and	his	students	to	Brentano’s	teachings.		
2.5.	The	Character	and	the	Existence	of	the	Outside	World	According	to	the	late	Brentano,	our	presentation	is	always	general	–	sensation	being	the	least	general	kind	of	it.	We	therefore	do	not	perceive	time,	space	and	individual	substances	as	they	are	in	themselves.	Hence,	there	is	an	unbreachable	limit	to	our	experience	of	the	external	reality.	Among	the	Prague	Brentanians	this	difference	of	for	us/in	itself	led	to	a	difference	in	perspectives.	While	Kraus	and	Kastil	presented	this	view	in	a	realistic	fashion,	stressing	the	fact	that	in	the	sciences	we	can	judge	about	features	of	transcendent	reality	even	though	certain	absolute	determinations	elude	us	(Kraus	1934b:	131-5,	Kastil	1951:	239-40),	Eisenmeier	(1923)	stressed	the	relational	character	of	our	scientific	understanding	of	transcendent	reality	as	something	that	excludes	and	confines	us	to	the	narrow	limits	of	our	experience.	When	Bergman	refused	Brentano’s	use	of	the	probability	calculus	in	his	proof	of	the	external	world,11	he	was	left	with	a	relational	structure	of	our	knowledge	that	could	be	interpreted	in	a	Neo-Kantian	fashion	as	well	as	in	a	more	Russellian	style	(see	Bergman	1920).	Furthermore,	Rogge	(1938:	168-9)	not	only	criticized	Brentano’s	proof	of	the	external	world,	but	also	pointed	out	the	circularity	in	Brentano’s	claim	that	the	natural	sciences	experimentally	prove	the	non-existence	of	sensory	qualities	in	the	real	world,	for	in	his	
Psychology	Brentano’s	already	defines	the	natural	sciences	as	dealing	with	a	world	radically	different	from	what	external	perception	shows	us	(see	Brentano	1874:	138).	
	
3.	Preference	and	Critique	of	the	Sum	of	the	Greatest	Good			
	Brentano’s	ethics	(as	distinct	from	Brentano’s	theory	of	moral	valuation)	is	based	on	the	principle	of	the	best	attainable	good,	i.e.	we	should	strive	for	“the	greatest	possible	spiritual	good	for	all	animate	beings	who	fall	within	our	sphere	of	influence”	(Brentano	1952:	222/2009b:	139;	see	CHAP.	24).	Since	the	will	is	for	Brentano	an	act	of	practical	preference,	the	general	concept	of	preference	and	the	ethical	principle	of	the	greatest	possible	good	were	often	discussed	among	the	Prague	Brentanists.	The	characteristic	features	of	these	discussions	about	“the	greatest	value”	was	an	interest	in	the	theories	of	economic	value	and	marginal	utility,	especially	in	the	form	developed	by	the	so-called	Austrian	school	of	
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Economics.	A	critique	of	the	general	points	of	these	theories	from	the	Brentanian	standpoint	was	offered	by	Kraus	(1902,	1937:	357-86)	and	by	Oskar	Engländer	(1914,	1931),	who	was	a	professor	of	economics	at	the	Prague	German	University.	Another	feature	of	these	discussions	was	a	critique	of	the	utilitarian	principle	of	the	sum	of	the	greatest	good,	which	Brentano	himself	might	not	have	differentiated	clear	enough	from	his	own	conception.	The	critique	of	the	sum	of	the	greatest	good	based	on	the	development	of	Brentano’s	remarks	in	Katkov’s	interesting	book	is	worth	mentioning	here	(Katkov	1937:	43-70,	see	also	Chisholm	1986).	According	to	Katkov,	an	essential	difference	between	correct	emotion	and	correct	judgment	(besides	the	fact	that	correct	judgments	do	not	admit	of	the	distinction	of	better	and	worse	and	correct	emotions	do	not	fall	under	the	law	of	the	excluded	middle)	is	that,	for	example,	from	correctly	loving	pleasure	as	such	it	does	not	follow	that	it	is	correct	to	love	all	cases	of	pleasure.	The	love	(or	hate)	of	the	object	as	such	based	in	the	content	of	its	general	content	does	not	imply	love	(or	hate)	of	all	objects	constituting	its	extension.	Other	considerations	suggests	that	the	positive	value	of	a	whole	is	not	a	simple	sum	of	the	positive	values	of	its	parts.	Thus	the	principle	of	bonum	variationis	states	that	if	two	goods	of	different	types	A	and	B	have	the	same	positive	value,	then	the	whole	consisting	of	goods	of	the	type	A+B	will	be	more	valuable	then	the	whole	consisting	merely	from	goods	of	the	type	A+A	or	B+B.	The	principle	of	bonum	progressionis	states	that	given	that	the	total	value	of	unordered	parts	of	a	development	of	some	entity	is	the	same,	a	progress	or	rise	of	a	value	of	that	entity	in	time	is	more	valuable	than	the	process	of	its	degeneration.	The	principle	of	the	individual	perfection	says	that	the	same	goods	will	create	a	better	whole	if	they	belong	to	the	same	individuum	than	if	they	belong	to	different	individua.	“Dostoyevsky’s	principle”	states	that	an	evil	done	to	one	individuum	cannot	be	somehow	undone	by	good	done	to	another	individuum.	The	same	logic	led	Katkov	to	claim	that	the	non-existence	of	a	whole	containing	one	part	unworthy	of	existence	is	preferable	to	its	existence.	The	whole	treatise	also	defends	the	view	that	simple	multiplication	of	an	individual	possessing	a	positive	value	would	create	only	more	objects	with	the	value	but	not	something	more	valuable	(compare:	the	multiplication	of	a	golden	individual	will	create	more	golden	things,	but	not	a	more	golden	whole).	The	classic	utilitarian	principle	of	the	greatest	good	is	for	Katkov	and	for	his	teacher	Kraus	a	secondary	rule	derived	from	the	main	principle	that	the	existence	of	something	good	is	itself	good	and	therefore	preferable	to	its	non-existence.	However,	its	grounding	is	rather	different:	“It	is	not	for	the	sake	of	increasing	goods	and	reducing	evils,	but	rather	for	the	sake	of	elevating	as	much	as	possible	the	incalculable	intrinsic	value	of	the	relevant	beings,	that	we	seek	to	make	the	goods	accessible	to	as	many	as	possible	and	we	
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strive	to	reduce	the	evils	as	much	as	possible.”	(Kraus	1937:	275)		
Conclusion		The	title	“The	Prague	School	of	Brentano”	covers	a	work	of	three	generations	of	followers	of	Brentano.	In	this	chapter,	we	mostly	tried	to	cover	some	selected	philosophical	motives	distinctive	of	its	last,	reistic	phase,	to	show	that	the	whole	movement	might	not	have	been	as	orthodox	in	relation	to	its	teacher	as	it	looks	from	the	apologetic	introductions	to	Brentano’s	work	written	by	Kastil	and	Kraus.	This	overview	hopefully	gives	the	impression	of	an	intellectual	movement	of	great	vitality	and	critical	acumen	forming	contacts	abroad	in	order	to	expand	its	horizons.	Unfortunately,	the	promising	signs	of	development	of	Brentano’s	thought	by	Prague	“reists”	in	the	thirties	were	cut	short	and	subsequently	erased	from	the	history	of	20th-century	philosophy	due	to	the	National	Socialistic	and	later	Communistic	regimes	that	brought	darkness	and	devastation	upon	Masaryk’s	democratic	Czechoslovakia.12				
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                                                1	The	Prague	Brentano	circle,	of	which	many	were	German-speaking	Jews	(e.g.	Kraus,	Utitz,	Bergman),	used	to	meet	after	Marty’s	lectures	in	the	Café	Louvre	to	continue	philosophical	discussions.	There	they	were	sometimes	joined	by	other	intellectual	members	of	the	Prague	German	Jewish	community:	Oskar	Pollack,	Max	Brod	and	Franz	Kafka.		2	Brentano	gave	Kraus	and	Kastil	free	hand	to	organize	and	put	together	the	unpublished	materials	from	his	literary	estate	in	a	way	that	would	correspond	to	his	late	reistic	views.	Reism	and	the	philosophical	theories	contained	in	the	resulting	books	(notably	Brentano	1930,	1933)	are	often	a	result	of	heavy-handed	editing	and	even	rewriting	and	reformulating	of	Brentano’s	texts.	While	it	is	sometimes	hard	to	say	whether	a	position	expressed	in	these	volumes	corresponds	to	Brentano’s	views,	these	books	can	be	safely	read	as	expressing	positions	of	the	Prague	and	Innsbruck	reism	at	the	time	of	their	publications.		3	The	list	of	known	members	of	the	Prague	Brentano	Society	given	by	Binder	(see	Binder	2000:	564)	states	the	following	English	members:	G.E.	Moore,	H.	Eaton,	D.	Hicks,	R.	Reeds.		4	The	reism	of	Brentano	and	his	followers	and	the	reism	of	Tadeusz	Kotarbinski	were	being	developed	independently	until	Twardowski	and	Katkov	made	Kotarbinski	aware	of	the	close	proximity	of	his	views	and	the	views	of	the	late	Brentano	(a	short	description	of	this	development	and	a	comparison	of	both	reistic	views	is	given	in	Kraus	1937:	268-271).	Kotarbinski	was	in	touch	with	Kraus	and	his	pupils	from	1930.	The	ties	between	Prague	and	Lvov	where	strengthened	in	1937	when	on	account	of	Twardowski’s	invitation	Kraus	gave	a	series	of	lectures	in	Poland.	Another	Polish	philosopher,	apart	from	Twardowski,	who	had	ties	to	the	Prague	Brentano	circle	was	Wladislaw	Tatarkiewicz.	Both	Kotarbinski	and	Tatarkiewicz	were	on	the	list	of	the	contributors	for	the	second	volume	of	the	Abhandlungen	zum	Gedächtnis	des	100.	Geburtages	von	Franz	Brentano	that	was	to	be	published	by	the	Prague	Brentano	Society	in	1939.	The	volume	never	saw	the	light	of	day	due	to	the	outbreak	of	the	war.				5	Utitz	wrote	a	book	about	the	psychology	of	life	in	the	Terezín	concentration	camp		which	has	recently	been	republished	together	with	his	shorter	texts	from	the	same	camp	(see	Utitz	2015).			6	The	following	discussions	are	necessarily	selective,	for	the	output	and	the	range	of	topics	of	the	orthodox	Brentanists	was	quite	large.		7	It	would	be	more	proper	to	say	“someone	who	judges”	but	this	makes	the	structure	of	some	further	statements	overly	complicated.			8	Since	conscious	subjects	differentiate	themselves	also	as	“judger”	and	“lovers	and	haters”	the	argument	could	be	extended	to	involve	all	fundamental	classes	of	intentionality.	For	a	more	formalized	version	of	the	Katkovian	perspective	see	Chisholm	1990.	An	a	priori	argument	for	the	grounding	of	intentionality	in	inner	perception	could	be	also	deduced	from	Brentano’s	late	conception	of	time,	which	claims	that	to	be	conscious	of	time	is	to	be	conscious	of	the	time	modes	of	presenting	acts	(see	CHAP.	6),	which	presupposes	self-consciousness.		9	Kraus	confesses	that	the	whole	theory	comes	from	what	he	wrote	down	after	he	read	and	discussed	a	psychognostic	fragment	of	Brentano	during	his	visit	with	Brentano	in	1901	and	that	he	wasn’t	able	to	find	this	view	in	Brentano’s	manuscripts	(Kraus	in	Brentano	1928:	146/1981b:	105).	What	Brentano	discussed	with	Kraus	was	most	likely	inspired	by	Brentano’s	reading	of	Leibniz’	Nouveaux	Essais.	In	his	1908	letter	to	Husserl	Brentano	writes:	“However,	I	saw	that	he	[Leibniz]	in	the	second	book	assumes	an	apperception	of	one’s	own	acts	by	acts	that	occur	later.	And	here	you	find	yourself	in	agreement	with	him,	but	I	don’t”.	Kraus	could	not	have	known	the	letter	since	it	was	published	only	in	1994	(Husserl	1994:	50).		10	“[This	theory	of	apperception]	can	only	be	a	casual	witticism,	not	a	serious	expression	of	belief,	for	otherwise	wherever	the	origins	of	the	concept	of	causality	are	noted	[in	the	works	of	Brentano]	the	case	of	inner	apperception	would	have	to	be	mentioned	as	well....	[F]or	an	immediate	knowledge	of	causality	very	definite	conditions	must	be	fulfilled;	these	conditions	are	fulfilled	only	in	the	case	of	axiomatic	grasping.”	(Rogge	1938:	172).			11	Psychology	from	an	Empirical	Standpoint	works	within	the	confines	of	critical	realism	without	providing	any	serious	“metaphysical”	proof	of	the	existence	of	the	outside	world.	Later,	Brentano	offered	a	proof	of	an	independent	world	or	real	objects	standing	under	causal	laws	(see	Brentano	1925:	118-30,	Kastil	1951:	223-9;	for	critique	see	Rogge	1935:	57-67,	77-87).		
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                                                                                                                                                            12	This	chapter	is	an	outcome	of	the	project	“From	Logical	Objectivism	to	Reism:	Bolzano	and	the	School	of	Brentano”	P401	15-18149S	(Czech	Science	Foundation),	realised	at	the	Institute	of	Philosophy	of	the	Czech	Academy	of	Sciences.	
